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You are judged by the company you keep : reputation leverage in vertically related markets

Choi, Jay Pil; Peitz, Martin - 2016

This paper analyzes a mechanism through which a supplier of unknown quality can overcome its asymmetric information … has established a reputation for delivering high quality vis-à-vis the supplier. The supplier may enter the market by … reputation, it may su¤er from a reputational barrier to entry arising from higher input costs. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011492196

You are judged by the company you keep: Reputation leverage in vertically related markets

Choi, Jay Pil; Peitz, Martin - 2016

This paper analyzes a mechanism through which a supplier of unknown quality can overcome its asymmetric information … downstream rm has established a reputation for delivering high quality vis-à-vis the supplier. The supplier may enter the … in the downstream market may lack reputation, it may su¤er from a reputational barrier to entry arising from …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011588686

How reasonable is the reasonable royalty rate?: Damage rules and probabilistic intellectual property rights

Choi, Jay Pil - 2006

This paper investigates how different damage rules in patent infringement cases shape competition when intellectual property rights are probabilistic. I develop a simple model of oligopolistic competition to compare two main liability doctrines that have been used in the US to assess...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263961

How Reasonable is the 'Reasonable' Royalty Rate? Damage Rules and Probabilistic Intellectual Property Rights

Choi, Jay Pil - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317488

Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation

Choi, Jay Pil - 2021

Most patent pools are formed in the shadow of patent litigation as an attempt to settle disputes in regard to conflicting infringement claims and the validity of patents. To reflect this reality, I develop a simple framework to analyze the incentives to form a patent pool or engage in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319657

Strategic Product Pre-Announcements in Markets with Network Effects

Choi, Jay Pil; Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard; Nahm, Jae Hyon - 2014

It is a widely adopted practice for firms to announce new products well in advance of actual market availability. The incentives for pre-announcements are stronger in markets with network effects because they can be used to induce the delay of consumers' purchases and forestall the build-up of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014061357

Strategic Product Pre-announcements in Markets with Network Effects

Choi, Jay Pil; Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard; Nahm, Jae - NET Institute - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005622712

You are judged by the company you keep : reputation leverage in vertically related markets

Choi, Jay Pil; Peitz, Martin - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011494211

Bundling new products with old to signal quality, with application to the sequencing of new products

Choi, Jay Pil - In: International journal of industrial organization 21 (2003) 8, pp. 1179-1200

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001787790

Net neutrality and investment incentives

Choi, Jay Pil; Kim, Byung-Cheol - 2008

This paper analyzes the effects of net neutrality regulation on investment incentives for Internet service providers (ISPs) and content providers (CPs), and their implications for social welfare. We show that the ISP's decision on the introduction of discrimination across content depends on a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264430