We show that when some investors hold levered portfolios by engaging in margin borrowing, repeated rounds of trading can result in market instability--in the sense that prices can move rationally--even in the absence of any change in fundamentals. We show this with a simple model in which all...

We argue that in the after-market trading of an IPO, the underwriting syndicate, by standing ready to buy back shares at the offer price (quot;price stabilizationquot;), compensates uninformed investors ex post for the adverse selection cost they face in bidding for IPOs. This dominates ex ante...

We propose a simple model in which all agents are rational and symmetrically informed. We show that when some investors hold levered portfolios by engaging in margin borrowing, repeated rounds of trading can result in market instability -- in the sense that prices can move rationally, even in...

We argue that in the after-market trading of an IPO, the underwriting syndicate, by standing ready to buy back shares at the offer price (price stabilization), compensates uninformed investors ex post for the adverse selection cost they face in bidding for IPOs. This dominates ex ante...