We provide an econometric framework for estimating a game of simultaneous entry and pricing decisions while allowing for correlations between unobserved cost and demand shocks. We use our framework to account for selection in the pricing stage. We estimate the model using data from the US...

We provide a practical method to estimate the payoff functions of players in complete information, static, discrete games. With respect to the empirical literature on entry games originated by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and Berry (1992), the main novelty of our framework is to allow for general...

We provide a practical method to estimate the payoff functions of players in complete information, static, discrete games. With respect to the empirical literature on entry games originated by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and Berry (1992), the main novelty of our framework is to allow for general...

We provide a practical method to estimate the payoff functions of players in complete information, static, discrete games. With respect to the empirical literature on entry games originated by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and Berry (1992), the main novelty of our framework is to allow for general...

We provide a framework for inference in discrete games that involve multiple decision makers and use it to study airline market structure in the US. We make inferences on a ``class of models'' rather that looking for point identifying assumptions that pin down a unique model. We extend the...

We provide a framework for inference in discrete games that involve multiple decision makers and use it to study airline market structure in the US. We make inferences on a "class of models" rather that looking for point identifying assumptions that pin down a unique model. Making inferences in...