We provide a framework to study bail-in regimes for banks. In the presence of a monitoring problem, the optimal bank capital structure combines standard debt, which liquidates the bank and provides strong monitoring incentives, and bail-in debt, which recapitalizes the bank but provides weaker...

This paper investigates the implications of heterogeneous price rigidities across sectors for the distributional and aggregate effects of monetary policy. First, we identify and characterize analytically a new set of earnings and expenditure channels of monetary policy that emerge in the...

We study the scope for international cooperation in macroprudential policies. Multinational banks contribute to and are affected by fire sales in countries they operate in. National governments setting quantity regulations non-cooperatively fail to achieve the globally efficient outcome,...

Should central banks’ inflation targets remain set in stone? We study a dynamic mechanism design problem between a government (principal) and a central bank (agent). The central bank has persistent private information about structural shocks. Firms learn the state from the central bank’s...

We study financial regulation when some financial institutions or capital flows are unregulated and there are pecuniary externalities. Optimal financial regulation is scaled by a ``regulatory arbitrage multiplier.'' The contribution of an unregulated actor to regulatory arbitrage can be...