To be admissible in federal court under the Daubert standard, expert economic testimony must be (1) based on scientific analysis and (2) aid the dispute resolution process. Expert evidence should be considered scientific when (1) it meets Karl Popper’s falsification standard and (2) some...

The rise of unilateral effects analysis, as quantified by merger simulation, creates the potential to balance anticompetitive effects and efficiencies and improve the merger review process. Unfortunately, sophisticated economic models impose a tight structure on the analytical process, one that...

The 2010 revision of the Merger Guidelines highlighted the importance of both economic modeling of the post-merger competitive process and effects evidence, defined as information able to predict the transaction’s likely competitive effect. With sufficient data, it is possible to see how...

In the Microsoft case, the Department of Justice (DOJ) applied Post-Chicago theories of strategic behavior to anecdotal evidence of Microsoft's behavior and obtained a judgment against specific conduct. This paper takes a critical look at the theories of the case and the industry facts to...

Using a combination of public and internal information, this paper compares and contrasts European Union (EU) and United States (US) merger policies. Common economic analysis leads both authorities to subject remarkably comparable portfolios of mergers to close scrutiny. Vertical mergers account...

At first glance, lawyers remain in control of price fixing analysis. Agreements to raise price are per-se illegal, and economists only seem needed to estimate damages. However, economic insights remain relevant; not all price-related agreements are driven by pricing issues and some price...

While the Merger Guidelines structure represents the standard approach to merger analysis in the US, economists have proposed methods to dispense with market definition and estimate the competitive effect directly. In this note, we argue that market definition is necessary to evaluate the...

Farrell and Shapiro’s Upward Pressure on Price (UPP) structure is advanced as a technique to screen mergers in differentiated product markets. Lacking an ability to link their analysis with experiences from relevant markets, Farrell and Shapiro propose to assume substantial efficiencies, and...

Farrell and Shapiro’s Upward Pressure on Price (UPP) framework is an innovative and elegant technique designed to evaluate mergers in differentiated product markets. The authors advance their approach primarily as a screen for unilateral effects cases, although others suggest that UPP might be...

Critical Loss analysis is an empirical implementation of the hypothetical monopolist test for market definition contained in the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines. As usually applied, the test accepts the proposed market definition as relevant for...