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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003643189
Cartels are illegal in India, as they are almost everywhere. They are subject to heavy fines. Why, then, do businesses frequently try to fix prices? Because doing so usually is profitable. On average cartels raise prices by more than 20%, and probably face less than a 25% chance of being caught...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013081128
For criminal violations of the Sherman Act, although guided by federal sentencing guidelines, U.S. Department of Justice has great latitude in recommending corporate cartel fines to the federal courts, and its recommendations are nearly always determinative. In this paper, we analyze the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013085647
Using the overcharge estimates for 333 cartel episodes, we evaluate the effect of cartel characteristics and changes in the market and legal environment on the magnitude of overcharges imposed by private cartels in the United States and other geographic markets as early as the eighteenth...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013152637
Using a sample of modern international cartels, we analyze the level and determinants of cartel sanctions imposed on the participants of these cartels in a number of antitrust jurisdictions. There is empirical evidence suggesting that gains from collusive conduct outweigh its costs represented...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012724686
This Article examines whether the current penalties in the United States Sentencing Guidelines are set at the appropriate levels to deter illegal price fixing cartels optimally. The authors analyze two data sets to determine how high on average cartels raise prices. The first consists of every...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012728627
GLOBAL PRICE FIXING (2nd Edition) was released by Springer at the end of 2006. This note reproduces a 2002 review of the first edition of the book by Prof. Douglas Greer. It is reproduced with the permission of the publisher of the Review of Industrial Organization
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012775648
Using the overcharge estimates for 333 cartel episodes, we evaluate the impact of cartel characteristics and changes in the market and legal environment on the magnitude of overcharges imposed by private cartels in the US and other geographic markets as early as the 18th century. The median...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012766577
This comment examines trends in anti-cartel enforcement by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (the Division) and coordinated actions by other U.S. Government agencies, with particular attention paid to developments in 2017 and 2018. By long-standing DOJ policy, criminal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012866244
For criminal violations of the Sherman Act, although guided by federal sentencing guidelines, U.S. Department of Justice has great latitude in recommending corporate cartel fines to the federal courts, and its recommendations are nearly always determinative. In this paper, we analyze the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012979998