The theory of mechanism design and implementation abounds with clever mechanisms whose equilibrium outcomes are optimal according to some social choice rule. However, the cleverness of these mechanisms relies on intricate systems of rewards and punishments off-the-equilibrium path. Generally, it...

We provide an elementary proof showing how in economies with an arbitrary number of agents an arbitrary number of public goods and quasi-Linear utility functions, any efficient and individually rational mechanism is not strategy-proof for any economy satisfying a mild segularity requirement.

In this paper we study the effects of a change in some exogenous variable (the number of players or a parameter in the payoff functions) on the strategies played and payoffs obtained in a Nash Equilibrium in the framework of a Market Game (a generalization of the Cournot model). We assume a...

In this paper we study the theoretical plausibility of the conjecture that inflation arises because imperfectly competitive markets (ICM in the sequel) translate cost pushes in large price increases. We define two different measures of inflation transmission. We compare these measures in several...

Since the 1970's most industrialized countries have undertaken massiveinvestment in computers and information technology (IT). Several stylizedfacts emerge from the empirical studies, see Landauer, 1993. In particular,they have found that this investment has not lead to a general increase...

In this paper we study the optimal trade policy in an oligopolistic market with a given number of quantity-setter firms. It is shown that under no fixed costs, the optimal trade policy displays certain characteristics but under fixed costs most of these characteristics no Longer hold.

This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economies with externalities. We provide two simple mechanisms implementing the Pigouvian Social Choice Correspondence in environments in which coalitions can be formed. Finally, we study economies in...

In this paper, we assume that firms can create independent divisions which compete in quantities in a homogeneous good market. Assuming complete information, identical firms and constant returns to scale, we prove the following: 1) Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) implies Perfect...

In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.

So far, the Theory of Distributive Justice has tried to single out a unique criterion of Justice. In our opinion, we live in a world in which different people hold conflicting ideas about justice. We propose a procedure for representing these individual opinions, by means of what we call...