We propose a profit-sharing rule that maximizes sustainability of cartel agreements. This rule is such that the critical discount factor is the same for all the firms. If a cartel applies this rule, then asymmetries among firms may not hinder collusion (contrarily to the typical finding in the...

This paper proposes a general framework to study the sustainability of collusion in markets where demand growth (although deterministic) is not restricted to occur at a constant rate and may trigger future entry. It is shown that, typically, entry occurs later along the collusive path than along...

We study competition between two shopping centers (department stores or shopping malls) located at the extremes of a linear city. In contrast with the existing literature, we do not restrict consumers to make all their purchases at a single place. We obtain this condition as an equilibrium...

We study the effect of quadratic differentiation costs in the Hotelling model of endogenous product differentiation. The equilibrium location choices are found to depend on the magnitude of the differentiation costs (relatively to the transportation costs supported by consumers). When the...

We extend an analytically solvable core-periphery model by introducing a monopolistically competitive sector of non-tradable goods. We study how trade costs affect the spatial distribution of economic activity. Trade costs have no effect when the elasticity of substitution among non-tradable...

We consider a model in which a free daily newspaper distributes news to readers and sells ad-space to advertisers, having private information about its readership. Depending on the type of readers in the market, the newspaper's may have a "plentiful and seeking" audience or a "lacking and...

We determine the optimal contract for the regulation of a bureaucratic firm in the case in which the bureaucratic bias is firm's private information. We find that output is distorted upward when the bureaucratic bias is low, downward when it is high, and equals a reference output when it is...

We study general equilibrium with private and incomplete state verification. Trade is agreed ex ante, that is, before private information is received. It is useful to define a list of bundles as a derivative good that gives an agent the right to receive one of the bundles in the list....

We investigate the continuity of equilibrium in differential information economies with a finite number of agents. In this setting, agents can make contingent contracts based on events that are commonly observed. With private information modelled as finite partitions of a compact and metrizable...

We study regulation of a bureaucratic provider of a public good in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. By bureaucratic we mean that it values output in itself, and not only profit. Three different financing systems are studied - cost reimbursement, prospective payment, and the...