Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. Effective auction design recognizes the importance of competition, not only in the auction, but in the downstream market for wireless communications. This paper examines several instruments...

A proposed auction design for incentive auctions is given. The two-sided auctions enable the exchange of spectrum from a low-value use, such as over-the-air TV broadcast, to a high-value use, such as mobile broadband. The approach is both simple and effective. The auction has three stages...

This paper examines the impact of an incumbent carrier’s participation in two simultaneously conducted auctions: one set-aside for non-incumbents and one open to all carriers. This paper estimates the extent to which prices in the closed auction were inflated by the participation of...

As the 700 MHz auction approaches, we are writing to clear up a common misconception about the nature of spectrum auctions and the impact of various rules on auction revenues.

There have been several comments that criticize auction rules that prevent the two major low-frequency incumbents from winning all of the newly available spectrum and incorporating it into their proprietary networks. Such rules include new-entrant set-asides, new-entrant bidding credits, and the...

Market design plays an essential role in promoting innovation. I examine emission allowance auctions, airport slot auctions, spectrum auctions, and electricity markets, and demonstrate how the market design can encourage innovation. Improved pricing information is one source of innovation....

In May 2008, Ofcom’s L-band auction concluded. This was Ofcom’s second combinatorial clock auction. The auction used an innovative format intended to encourage an efficient assignment of the 17 lots. Eight bidders competed for the lots. In sharp contrast to the first combinatorial clock...

We analyze a discrete clock auction with lowest-accepted bid (LAB) pricing and provisional winners, as adopted by India for its 3G spectrum auction. In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the provisional winner shades her bid while provisional losers do not. Such differential shading leads to...