Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. Effective auction design recognizes the importance of competition, not only in the auction, but in the downstream market for wireless communications. This paper examines several instruments...

A proposed auction design for incentive auctions is given. The two-sided auctions enable the exchange of spectrum from a low-value use, such as over-the-air TV broadcast, to a high-value use, such as mobile broadband. The approach is both simple and effective. The auction has three stages...

Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. The standard approach is the simultaneous ascending auction, in which many related lots are auctioned simultaneously in a sequence of rounds. I analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the approach...

Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. Effective auction design recognizes the importance of competition, not only in the auction, but in the downstream market for wireless communications. This paper examines several instruments...

Several partners jointly own an asset that may be traded among them. Each partner has a valuation for the asset; the valuations are known privately and drawn independently from a common probability distribution. We characterize the set of all incentive-compatible and interim- individually-...

Changes in technologies and in consumer demands have made prior radio spectrum allocations far from efficient. To address this problem the FCC has recently reallocated spectrum for more flexible use in bands that are partially occupied by incumbent license holders. Often, it is necessary for the...

This paper examines the impact of an incumbent carrier’s participation in two simultaneously conducted auctions: one set-aside for non-incumbents and one open to all carriers. This paper estimates the extent to which prices in the closed auction were inflated by the participation of...

As the 700 MHz auction approaches, we are writing to clear up a common misconception about the nature of spectrum auctions and the impact of various rules on auction revenues.

There have been several comments that criticize auction rules that prevent the two major low-frequency incumbents from winning all of the newly available spectrum and incorporating it into their proprietary networks. Such rules include new-entrant set-asides, new-entrant bidding credits, and the...