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The Kyoto summit initiated an international game of cap and trade. Unlike a national policy, the essence of this game is the self-selection of national emission targets. This differs from the standard global public-goods game because targets are met in the context of a global carbon market. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010575704
Global cap and trade equalizes the price of emissions and leads to efficient abatement across countries, but sets the abatement level inefficiently low. It is set too low, because the global cap is the sum of individual country targets set on the basis of self-interest. The efficiency of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010575724
The international game of cap and trade begins when countries choose their quantity targets, which are largely selected according to self interest. The analogous public-goods game, in which countries choose their abatement levels, has an uncooperative outcome. Compared to that, the Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010575726
Greenhouse gas abatement is a public good, so climate policy is a public-goods game and suffers from the free-rider incentives that make the outcome of such games notoriously uncooperative. Adopting an international agreement can change the nature of the game, reducing or exacerbating the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008460853
and are fully efficient in our setting. Our experimental results indicate that the LAB auction achieves higher revenues …. This also is the case in a version of the clock auction with provisional winners. This revenue result may explain the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008460856
approach is the simultaneous ascending auction, in which many related lots are auctioned simultaneously in a sequence of rounds … variation, the package clock auction, adopted by the UK, which addresses many of the problems of the simultaneous ascending … auction while building on its strengths. The package clock auction is a simple dynamic auction in which bidders bid on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014041583
Developing countries justifiably reject meaningful emission targets. This prevents the Kyoto Protocol from establishing a global price for greenhouse gas emissions, and leaves almost all new emissions unpriced. This paper proposes a new pair of commitments—a commitment to a binding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008480345
Developing countries reject meaningful emission targets (recent intensity caps are no exception), while many industrialized countries insist that developing countries accept them. This impasse has prevented the Kyoto Protocol from establishing a global price for greenhouse gas emissions. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008460857
auctioning a significant share of total permits. This report discusses important theoretical and practical auction design aspects … for allocating emissions permits in Australia. Particularly interesting is the proposal to simultaneously auction multiple …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008693300
more popular. The EU is now moving to auction more than 50 per cent of all permits in 2013, and in the US the Regional … permits. This paper discusses the proposed Australian CPRS’s auction design. A major difference to other emissions trading … schemes is that the CPRS plans to auction multiple vintages of emissions permits simultaneously. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010879126