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Comparing models of strategic thinking in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's coordination games

Costa-Gomes, Miguel A.; Crawford, Vincent P.; Iriberri, … - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 7 (2009) 2/3, pp. 365-376

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003869511

Level-k auctions : can a nonequilibrium model of strategic thinking explain the winner's curse and overbidding in private-value auctions?

Crawford, Vincent P.; Iriberri, Nagore - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 75 (2007) 6, pp. 1721-1770

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003611952

Fatal attraction : salience, nai͏̈veté, and sophistication in experimental "hide-and-seek" games

Crawford, Vincent P.; Iriberri, Nagore - In: The American economic review 97 (2007) 5, pp. 1731-1750

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Structural models of nonequilibrium strategic thinking : theory, evidence, and applications

Crawford, Vincent P.; Costa-Gomes, Miguel A.; Iriberri, … - In: Journal of economic literature 51 (2013) 1, pp. 5-62

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009760828

Fatal attraction : focality, naivete and sophistication in experimental "hide and seekʺ games

Crawford, Vincent P. (contributor); … - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003761455

Level-k auctions : can a non-equilibrium model of strategic thinking explain the winner's curse and overbidding in private-value auctions?

Crawford, Vincent P. (contributor); … - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003761965

Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?

Crawford, Vincent P.; Iriberri, Nagore - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005248584

Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games

Crawford, Vincent P.; Iriberri, Nagore - UCLA Department of Economics - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005359235

Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?

Crawford, Vincent P.; Iriberri, Nagore - UCLA Department of Economics - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005359281

Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?

Crawford, Vincent P.; Iriberri, Nagore - In: Econometrica 75 (2007) 6, pp. 1721-1770

This paper proposes a structural nonequilibrium model of initial responses to incomplete-information games based on "level-k" thinking, which describes behavior in many experiments with complete-information games. We derive the model's implications in first- and second-price auctions with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005332769