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Forced saving, redistribution and nonlinear social security schemes

Cremer, Helmuth; De Donder, Philippe; Maldonado, Darío; … - 2008

selfʺ emerges when labor supply and savings decisions are made. The social welfare function is paternalistic: the rate of … show that the paternalistic solution does not necessarily imply forced savings for the myopics. This is because …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003720340

Forced saving, redistribution, and nonlinear social security schemes

Cremer, Helmuth; De Donder, Philippe; Maldonado, Darío; … - In: Southern economic journal 76 (2009) 1, pp. 86-98

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003880389

International migration, human capital formation, and saving

Stark, Oded; Dorn, Agnieszka - 2013

option to save. -- Human capital formation ; Savings ; Intertemporal choice ; Prospect of migrating …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009687810

International migration, human capital formation, and saving

Stark, Oded; Agnieszka Dorn - 2013

option to save. -- Human capital formation ; Savings ; Intertemporal choice ; Prospect of migrating …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009700329

International Migration, Human Capital Formation, and Saving

Stark, Oded - 2013

In the model of Stark et al. (1997, 1998), the possibility of employment in a developed country raises the level of human capital acquired by workers in the developing country. We show that this result holds even when workers have the option to save

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087331

Can the evolution of joint savings agreements counter the effect of higher costs of migration on its intensity?

Stark, Oded; Jakubek, Marcin - 2022

divided into two sets: those who save by themselves to pay for the cost of their migration, and those who pool their savings … with the savings of another would-be migrant to pay for the cost. Saving jointly brings forward the timing of migration …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013260051