We study the design of optimal (private and/or social) insurance schemes for formal home care and institutional care. We consider a three period model. Individuals are either in good health, lightly dependent or heavily dependent. Lightly dependent individuals can buy formal home care which...

We study the design of optimal (private and/or social) insurance schemes for formal home care and institutional care. We consider a three period model. Individuals are either in good health, lightly dependent or heavily dependent. Lightly dependent individuals can buy formal home care which...

We study the design of optimal (private and/or social) insurance schemes for formal home care and institutional care. We consider a three period model. Individuals are either in good health, lightly dependent or heavily dependent. Lightly dependent individuals can buy formal home care which...

We study the design of optimal (private and/or social) insurance schemes for formal home care and institutional care. We consider a three period model. Individuals are either in good health, lightly dependent or heavily dependent. Lightly dependent individuals can buy formal home care which...

This paper studies the determination of informal long-term care (family aid) to dependent elderly in a worst case scenario concerning the harmony of family relations. Children are purely selfish, and neither side can make credible commitments (which rules out efficient bargaining). The model is...

This paper studies the design of health insurance with ex post moral hazard, when there is imperfect competition in the market for the medical product. Various scenarios, such as monopoly pricing, price negotiation or horizontal differentiation are considered. The insurance contract specifies...

This paper studies the design of health insurance with ex post moral hazard, when there is imperfect competition in the market for the medical product. Various scenarios, such as monopoly pricing, price negotiation or horizontal differentiation are considered. The insurance contract specifies...

This paper studies the determination of informal long-term care (family aid) to dependent elderly in a worst case scenario concerning the harmony of family relations. Children are purely selfish, and neither side can make credible commitments (which rules out efficient bargaining). The model is...

This paper examines whether myopia (misperception of the long-term care (LTC) risk) and private insurance market loading costs can justify social LTC insurance and/or the subsidization of private insurance. We use a two-period model wherein individuals differ in three unobservable...

This paper studies a market for a medical product in which there is perfect competition among health insurers, while the good is sold by a monopolist. Individuals differ in their severity of illness and there is ex post moral hazard. We consider two regimes: one in which insurers use coinsurance...