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We are given a bipartite graph G = (A B;E) where each vertex has a preference list ranking its neighbors: in particular, every a A ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference, whereas the preference list of any b B may contain ties. A matching M is popular if there is no matching M' such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011944920
Stable flows generalize the well-known concept of stable matchings to markets in which transactions may involve several agents, forwarding flow from one to another. An instance of the problem consists of a capacitated directed network in which vertices express their preferences over their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290264
graph. Results from the literature seem to suggest that stable and dominant matchings behave, from a complexity theory point …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290306
Our input is a complete graph G on n vertices where each vertex has a strictranking of all other vertices in G. The goal is to construct a matching in G that is "globallystable" or popular. A matching M is popular if M does not lose a head-to-head election againstany matching M': here each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290307
Stable flows generalize the well-known concept of stable matchings to markets in which transactions may involve several agents, forwarding flow from one to another. An instance of the problem consists of a capacitated directed network in which vertices express their preferences over their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012011575
graph. Results from the literature seem to suggest that stable and dominant matchings behave, from a complexity theory point …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012211535
Our input is a complete graph G on n vertices where each vertex has a strictranking of all other vertices in G. The goal is to construct a matching in G that is "globallystable" or popular. A matching M is popular if M does not lose a head-to-head election againstany matching M': here each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012211577
We are given a bipartite graph G = (A B;E) where each vertex has a preference list ranking its neighbors: in particular, every a A ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference, whereas the preference list of any b B may contain ties. A matching M is popular if there is no matching M' such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011757166
We consider two variants of the classical Stable Roommates problem with Incomplete (but strictly ordered) preference lists (SRI) that are degree constrained, i.e., preference lists are of bounded length. The first variant, egal d-SRI, involves finding an egalitarian stable matching in solvable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011944923
An unceasing problem of our prevailing society is the fair division of goods. The problem of proportional cake cutting focuses on dividing a heterogeneous and divisible resource, the cake, among n players who value pieces according to their own measure function. The goal is to assign each player...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290266