of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure … economic incentives are important to promote corporate governance and deter fraud …

of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure … economic incentives are important to promote corporate governance and deter fraud …

of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure … economic incentives are important to promote corporate governance and deter fraud …

We examine whether analyst coverage influences corporate fraud in China. The fraud triangle specifies three main … factors, i.e. opportunity, incentive, and rationalization. On the one hand, analysts may reduce the fraud opportunity factor …, analysts may increase the fraud incentive factor by pressurizing managers to achieve short-term performance targets, which can …

Statistics reporting litigated cases of fraud on an exchange-by-exchange basis are not readily available to investors … United Kingdom and the United States – to show litigated cases of fraud significantly vary by country, and the different … data examined suggest listing standards have a strong influence over the nature of observed fraud by securities commissions …

We examine the influence of auditors on mitigating corporate fraud in China, which is known to have weak legal … regulatory enforcement actions against corporate fraud in the subsequent year. We show that this effect is moderated by the … governance mechanism to discourage executives with lower integrity in committing fraud. Our results have policy implications for …