Principle-agent theory suggests managers might under-invest into R&D for reasons of risk tied to project failure, such … as reduced remuneration and job loss. However, managers might over-invest into innovation for reasons of growth implying … higher remuneration, power and prestige. Using a sample of 1,406 Belgian firms, we find, first, that managers holding no …

Principle-agent theory suggests managers might under-invest into R&D for reasons of risk tied to project failure, such … as reduced remuneration and job loss. However, managers might over-invest into innovation for reasons of growth implying … higher remuneration, power and prestige. Using a sample of 1,406 Belgian firms, we find, first, that managers holding no …

CEOs, managers and non-managerial employees’ ideas enhances small firms’ innovation performance. A Heckman selection model … on 305 small firms shows that not only CEO’s and managers’, but also non-managerial employees’ ideas contribute to …

CEOs, managers and non-managerial employees' ideas enhances small firms' innovation performance. A Heckman selection model … on 305 small firms shows that not only CEO's and managers', but also non-managerial employees' ideas contribute to …

CEOs, managers and non-managerial employees' ideas enhances small firms' innovation performance. A Heckman selection model … on 305 small firms shows that not only CEO's and managers', but also non-managerial employees' ideas contribute to …