We study an extension of Jain and Mirman (1999) with two insiders under three different market structures : (i) Cournot competition among the insiders, (ii) Stackelberg game between the insiders and (iii) monopoly in the real market and Stackelberg in the financial market. We show how the...

We study an extension of Jain and Mirman (1999) with two insiders under three different market structures: (i) Cournot competition among the insiders, (ii) Stackelberg game between the insiders and (iii) monopoly in the real market and Stackelberg in the financial market. We show how the...

We embed signaling in the classical Cournot model in which several firms sell a homogeneous good. The quality is known to all the firms, but only to some buyers. The quantity-setting firms can manipulate the price to signal quality. Because there is only one price in a market for a homogeneous...

We study an extension of Jain and Mirman (1999) with two insiders under three different market structures : (i) Cournot competition among the insiders, (ii) Stackelberg game between the insiders and (iii) monopoly in the real market and Stackelberg in the financial market. We show how the...

The recent theoretical research on the informational effect of insider trading in the spirit of Kyle (1985) and Jain and Mirman (1999) was mainly interested in the interaction between the financial and real decisions of the insider, taking into consideration different market structures in both...

In this article, we extend the one-period model of Jain and Mirman (1999) for asset trading with two correlated signals to a two period model. We then prove the existence and uniqueness of the Bayesian linear equilibrium. Finally, we perform comparative statics analysis with respect to Kyle...

In this paper, we study a version of the static Jain-Mirman (2002) model in which competition in the real sector is introduced. In this paper, we add competition in the stock sector to the Jain-Mirman (2002) paper. We show that the linear equilibrium structure is affected by this competition in...

In this paper we examine the real and financial effects of two insiders trading in a static Jain-Mirman model (Henceforth JM). The first insider is the manager of the firm. The second insider is the owner. First, we study the change of the linear-equilibrium variables, in the presence of two...