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Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - 2009

A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325896

How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy

Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - 2012

This paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators. The firm may induce legislators to support the policy by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representative support the policy. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281930

Biased contests

Dahm, Matthias; Porteiro, Nicolás - In: Public choice 136 (2008) 1/2, pp. 55-67

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003726021

Side effects of campaign finance reform

Dahm, Matthias; Porteiro, Nicolás - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 6 (2008) 5, pp. 1057-1077

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003754170

Side-Effects of campaign finance reform

Dahm, Matthias (contributor); Porteiro, Nicolás (contributor) - 2005

relevant information, we also assume that lobbies engage in non-negligible informational lobbying. We focus on a single … political decision to be taken and offer a simple model in which the optimal influence strategy is a mixture of both lobbying … lobbying so that less policy relevant information is available and as a result political decisions become less efficient …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003780356

Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure

Dahm, Matthias (contributor); Porteiro, Nicolás (contributor) - 2005

decision-maker and to exert political pressure on her. We show that both lobbying instruments are interdependent. In our view … constraints governing informational lobbying determine a specific lottery available. The circumstances under which political … risk. The combination of lotteries available and induced risk preference determines the optimal lobbying behavior. Our …