We study the role of tax share and transparency of governance on growth and stagnation. A local government maximizes its private benefits using two activities. The first one consists of providing local public goods that help local firms to increase profits, thus enlarging tax revenue. The second...

We study the role of tax share and transparency of governance on growth and stagnation. A local government maximizes its private benefits using two activities. The first one consists of providing local public goods that help local firms to increase profits, thus enlarging tax revenue. The second...

We formulate a dynamic game model of trade in an exhaustible resource with a quantity-setting cartel. We compute the feedback Nash equilibrium and two Stackelberg equilibria under two different leadership scenarios: leadership by the strategic importing country, and leadership by the exporting...

Does a country strictly gain if it acts as a leader in a resource market under bilateral monopoly? Using differential games, we show that the answer is "yes" when leadership can be exercised globally (global Stackelberg leadership), but possibly "no" when it is exercised only at each stage...

The purpose of this study is to illustrate, using a simple model of monopolistic competition with multi-product firms, how trade liberalization affects the degree of foreign brand penetration. We model this in terms of the profit incentives for domestic entrepreneurs to choose to offer domestic...

Using a two-factor (labor and capital), two-good (shift-working and non shiftworking commodities) model with two countries (Home and Foreign) which are located in different time zones, we highlight the impact of trade in labor services (via communication networks) on the comparative advantage of...

Constructing a dynamic game model of trade of an exhaustible resource, this paper compares feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibria when the exporting country sets quantity rather than price. We consider two different leadership scenarios: leadership by the importing country, and leadership by...

We formulate a dynamic game model of trade in an exhaustible resource with a quantity-setting cartel. We compute the feedback Nash equilibrium and two Stackelberg equilibria under two different leadership scenarios: leadership by the strategic importing country, and leadership by the exporting...

Teaching trade patterns and trade gains under the Ricardian trade model is one of the most difficult tasks for teachers of international economics. We propose that the utilization of both the PPF and a labor market graph makes the understanding of Ricardian trade gains much easier

We study the role of tax share and transparency of governance on growth and stagnation. A local government maximizes its private benefits using two activities. The first one consists of providing local public goods that help local firms to increase profits, thus enlarging tax revenue. The second...