A multidimensional-and-sequential screening problem arises in a framework where the agent is privately informed about expected cost and cost variability and, subsequently, learns the realized cost as well. As the principal's marginal surplus function becomes less concave/more convex, the optimal...

A government delegates construction and operation of an essential facility to a private firm. When parties sit at the contracting table, they are uncertain about the operating cost. At the construction stage, the firm can improve its distribution by exerting some non-contractible effort. As soon...

This paper focuses on the existence of a Cournot equilibrium in a n- firm Cournot market for a single homogeneous commodity. Using a simple argument and proof, it shows that a Cournot equilibrium exists if each firm's marginal revenue declines with its own output and some weak non-decreasing...

A government delegates a build-operate-transfer project to a private firm. At the contracting stage, the operating cost is unknown. The firm can increase the likelihood of facing a low cost (the good state) by exerting effort when building the infrastructure. Once this is in place, the firm...

We consider a sequential screening problem where, in the contracting stage, the agent has private information on both the expected value and the spread of the unit cost of production. As the principal’s marginal surplus function becomes less concave / more convex in consumption units,...

A government delegates a build-operate-transfer project to a private firm. At the contracting stage, the operating cost is unknown. The firm can increase the likelihood of facing a low cost (the good state), rather than a high cost (the bad state), by exerting costly effort when building the...