We model an infinitely repeated Tullock contest, over the sharing of some given resource, between two ethnic groups. The resource is allocated by a composite state institution according to relative ethnic control; hence the ethnic groups contest the extent of institutional ethnic bias. The...

We examine the consequences, of integrating large minorities into productivity-relevant majority ethno-linguistic norms, for distribution, ethnic conflict and crime. We develop a two-community model where such assimilation generates social gains by: (a) facilitating economic interaction, and (b)...

We investigate the impact of community power on the practice of untouchability in rural India. We model two-dimensional simultaneous group conflict over social norms, wherein an upper and backward (OBC) caste Hindu bloc contests the 'scheduled' castes (SCs) over the extent to which behavioural...

We consider a two-person Cournot game of voluntary contributions to a public good with identical individual preferences, and examine equilibrium aggregate welfare under a separable, symmetric and concave social welfare function. Assuming the public good is pure, Itaya, de Meza and Myles (Econ....

We model simultaneous inter and within identity-group conflict in two territories connected by cross-territorial spill-overs. Within each territory, two groups contest the division of a group-specific public good, and all members contest the division of group income. Each group has a...

We examine how cross-community cost or benefit spillovers, arising from the consumption of group-specific public goods, affect both inter-group conflicts over the appropriation of such goods and decentralized private provision for their production. Our model integrates production versus...

We examine how cross-community cost or benefit spillovers, arising from the consumption of group-specific public goods, affect both inter-group conflicts over the appropriation of such goods and decentralized private provision for their production. Our model integrates production versus...

We examine how inequality in the endowment of secure wealth, mediated through voluntary public good provision, affects rent-seeking within and between groups. We model a scenario where two communities, each internally differentiated into rich, intermediate and poor segments, contest one another...

We examine how inequality in the endowment of secure wealth, mediated through voluntary public communities, each internally differentiated into rich, intermediate and poor segments, contest one another for the division of some rent. Any rent accruing to a community is distributed internally...

We model a contest between two groups of equal population size over the division of a group-specific public good. Each group is fragmented into sub-groups. Each sub-group allocates effort between production and contestation. There is perfect coordination within sub-groups, but sub-groups cannot...