We exhibit an efficient auction (an auction that maximizes surplus conditional on all available information). For private values, the Vickrey auction (for one good) or its Groves-Clarke extension (for multiple goods) is efficient. We show that the Vickrey and Groves-Clarke auctions can be...

This article identifies biases in market portfolios of parallel research projects arising from the noncongruence of social goals and private aspirations, occasioned by those circumstances where the market rewards only the winner and where the winner is awarded the entire social surplus. It is...

We propose an evolutionary explanation for the pattern of intertemporal preference reversals often ascribed to "hyperbolic discounting." We take the view that preferences—manifested, for example, in urges, cravings, and inclinations— are the outcome of evolutionary forces, and so will induce...

We show that simple majority rule satisfies five standard and attractive axioms-the Pareto property, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and (generic) decisiveness-over a larger class of preference domains than (essentially) any other voting rule. Hence, in this...