We examine how professional traders behave in two financial market experiments; we contrast professional traders' behavior to that of undergraduate students, the typical experimental subject pool. In our first experiment, both sets of participants trade an asset over multiple periods after...

We examine how professional traders behave in two financial market experiments; we contrast professional traders' behavior to that of undergraduate students, the typical experimental subject pool. In our first experiment, both sets of participants trade an asset over multiple periods after...

We examine how professional traders behave in two financial market experiments; we contrast professional traders' behavior to that of undergraduate students, the typical experimental subject pool. In our first experiment, both sets of participants trade an asset over multiple periods after...

We present a novel experimental design to study social learning in the laboratory. Subjects have to predict the value of a good in a sequential order. We elicit each subject's belief twice: first ("prior belief"), after he observes his predecessors' action; second ("posterior belief"), after he...

We present a social learning experiment in which subjects predict the value of a good in sequence. We elicit each subject's belief twice: first ("first belief"), after he observes his predecessors' prediction; second, after he also observes a private signal. Our main result is that subjects...

In our laboratory experiment, subjects, in sequence, have to predict the value of a good. The second subject in the sequence makes his prediction twice: first ("first belief"), after he observes his predecessor's prediction; second ("posterior belief"), after he observes his private signal. We...

We present a novel experimental design to study social learning in the laboratory. Subjects have to predict the value of a good in a sequential order. We elicit each subject's belief twice: first ("prior belief"), after he observes his predecessors' action; second ("posterior belief"), after he...

We present a social learning experiment in which subjects predict the value of a good in sequence. We elicit each subject's belief twice: first ("first belief"), after he observes his predecessors' prediction; second, after he also observes a private signal. Our main result is that subjects...

In our laboratory experiment, subjects, in sequence, have to predict the value of a good. The second subject in the sequence makes his prediction twice: first ("first belief"), after he observes his predecessor's prediction; second ("posterior belief"), after he observes his private signal. We...