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Unexpected increases in interest rates during the early 1980s and decreases in asset quality in the late 1980s caused massive losses throughout the savings and loan industry. Insolvency was common, if not the rule. But because of bureaucratic forbearance, funding constraints, and federal deposit...
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This paper estimates the losses embedded in the capital positions of the 996 FSLIC-insured savings and loan institutions that did not meet capital standards at the end of the 1970s. We compare the estimated cost of resolving the insolvencies of these institutions at the end of the 1970s with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005428255
An examination of the effect of the collapse of the Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund on insured financial institutions in the context of the incentive-conflict model developed by Edward Kane, finding that differences in abnormal returns of FDIC and FSLIC firms tend to reaffirm that taxpayer-funded...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005428423
Regulatory agencies are unwilling or unable to close thrift institutions immediately upon insolvency. Instead, they have progressively reduced the thrift capital requirement, refrained from enforcing that requirement, and allowed thrifts to hold more nonmortgage loans in the hope that the...
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This paper studies at the forbearance bet taken by policy makers at the end of the 1970s. We define forbearance as the failure of regulators to enforce book capital standards at the end of 1979. By comparing the cost of prompt regulatory intervention (defined here as closure or reorganization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012732311