Relationships between large customers and suppliers expose lenders to additional risks. These risks may force lead agents to retain a larger share of syndicated loans, reducing loan-level diversification, and, in turn, increasing the required interest rate spread. Consistent with this view, we...

We investigate the risk-taking behaviour of Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) that are subject to the Dodd–Frank Act (DFA). Specifically, we employ a difference-in-differences method to assess the effectiveness of the DFA in reducing the riskiness of complex banks and their contribution to...

Do development banks affect the structure of loan syndicates? We argue that development banks' participation in syndicates can reduce the lead banks' monitoring efforts and generate higher risk diversification across lenders. Using a global dataset of syndicated loans from 2001 to 2016 for 105...

Does a decline in shareholder litigation enhance managers’ monitoring efforts by ensuring adequate firm risk management? We explore how state Universal Demand laws (which limit shareholder litigation as a mechanism to discipline managers, UD law hereafter), affects bank holding companies’...

We explore to what extent firms’ economic behavior can be distorted because of the perceived threat of coercive actions from mafia-type organizations. To address this issue, we examine trade credit provision to firms whose top executives share the same surname as known Mafiosi (mafia-surname...