We employ a unique data set containing bank-specific information to explore how foreign bank entry determines credit allocation in emerging markets. We investigate the impact of the mode of foreign entry (greenfield or takeover) on banks' portfolio allocation to borrowers with different degrees...

We employ a unique data set containing bank-specific information to explore how foreign bank entry determines credit allocation in emerging markets. We investigate the impact of the mode of foreign entry – greenfield and takeover – on banks' portfolio allocation to borrowers with different...

We show that competing firms relax overall competition by lowering future barriers to entry. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclose borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to enter their market....

We show that competing firms relax overall competition by lowering future barriers to entry. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclose borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to enter their market....

This paper characterizes price competition between an expert and a non-expert. In contrast with the expert, the non-expert’s repair technology is not always successful. Consumers visit the expert after experiencing an unsuccessful match at the non-expert. This re-entry affects the behaviour of...

We study the competitive and welfare consequences when only one firm must commit to uniform pricing while the competitor's pricing policy is left unconstrained. The asymmetric no-discrimination constraint prohibits both behavior-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and...

We study the competitive and welfare consequences when only one firm must commit to uniform pricing while the competitor's pricing policy is left unconstrained. The asymmetric no-discrimination constraint prohibits both behavior-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and...