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Epistemic game theory formalizes assumptions about rationality and mutual beliefs in a formal language, then studies their behavioral implications in games. Specifically, it asks: what do different notions of rationality and different assumptions about what players believe about…what...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255416
Epistemic game theory formalizes assumptions about rationality and mutual beliefs in a formal language, then studies their behavioral implications in games. Specifically, it asks: what do different notions of rationality and different assumptions about what players believe about…what others...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025447
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824432
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824752
What behavior can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent faces temptation but is otherwise a “standard rational agent”? In earlier work, Gul–Pesendorfer [2001] use a set betweenness axiom to restrict the set of preferences considered by Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [2001] to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766753
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were al- lowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766798
We define and analyze a "strategic topology" on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens- Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a fixed game and action define the distance be- tween a pair of types as the di¤erence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766882
We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this prac- tice were allowed and free of stigma. Two "lobbyists" compete for the votes of legislators by offering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists' budget constraints...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766905
We explore sequential voting in symmetric two-option environments. We show that the (informative) symmetric equilibria of the simultaneous voting game are also equilibria in any sequential voting structure. In unanimity games, (essentially) the whole set of equilibria is the same in all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588287
We propose a method to test a prediction of the distribution of a stochastic process. In a non-Bayesian non-parametric setting, a predicted distribution is tested using a realization of the stochastic process. A test associates a set of realizations for each predicted distribution, on which the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588300