A model where a portion of the population participates in illegal activities is developed. The propensity to participate in crimes depends on the probability and the opportunity cost of beingarrested. The government can influence these variables by law enforcement expenditures and by social...

Es wird ein Modell präsentiert, in dem ein Teil der Bevölkerung straffällig wird.Die Neigung zur Kriminalität hängt von der Wahrscheinlichkeit ab, entdeckt zuwerden, sowie von den Opportunitätskosten, falls man entdeckt wird. Der Staatkann diese Variablen durch Strafverfolgungsmaßnahmen...

We use a stylized model to show that, if transfers to the poor arefounded on a security argument, there is a negative trade-off betweenlaw enforcement expenditures and criminality. In contrast, if transfersare based on altruism, the correlation between the same variables mayappear positive. We...

We use a stylized model to show that, if transfers to the poor are founded on a security argument, there is a negative trade-o¤ between law enforcement expenditures and criminality. In contrast, if transfers are based on altruism, the correlation between the same variables may appear positive....

We use a stylized model to show that, if transfers to the poor are founded on a security argument, there is a negative trade-off between law enforcement expenditures and criminality. In contrast, if transfers are based on altruism, the correlation between the same variables may appear positive....

We use a stylized model to show that, if transfers to the poor are founded on a security argument, there is a negative trade-off between law enforcement expenditures and criminality. In contrast, if transfers are based on altruism, the correlation between the same variables may appear positive....