[...]In this article, we explore the relationship betweenfranchise value and risk taking over the 1986-94 period.We extend Keeley’s empirical analysis by estimating theeffect of franchise value on a variety of measures of bankrisk. We find an inverse relationship between franchisevalue and an...

The moral hazard problem associated with deposit insurance generates the potential for excessive risk taking on the part of bank owners. The banking literature identifies franchise value a firm's profit-generating potential as one force mitigating that risk taking. We argue that in the presence...

The literature on executive compensation at banks has proceeded largely under the assumption that a single elasticity can adequately describe the sensitivity of executive pay to firm performance, but theories of performance-based pay and tournament pay suggest that this assumption may be...

The moral hazard problem associated with deposit insurance generates the potential for excessive risk taking on the part of bank owners. The banking literature identifies franchise value -- a firm's profit-generating potential -- as one force mitigating that risk taking. In the presence of...

As protectors of the safety and soundness of the banking system, banking supervisors are responsible for keeping banks' risk taking in check. The authors explain that franchise value--the present value of the stream of profits that a firm is expected to earn as a going concern--makes the...