We use the two-country model of the euro area developed by Quint and Rabanal (2014) to study policymaking in the European Monetary Union (EMU). In particular, we focus on strategic interactions: 1) between monetary policy and a common macroprudential authority, and; 2) between an EMU-level...

To conduct policy efficiently, central banks must use available data to infer, or learn, the relevant structural relationships in the economy. However, because a central bank's policy affects economic outcomes, the chosen policy may help or hinder its efforts to learn. This paper examines...

Economic outcomes in dynamic economies with forward-looking agents depend crucially on whether or not the central bank can precommit, even in the absence of the traditional "inflation bias." This paper quantifies the welfare differential between precommitment and discretionary policy in both a...

An important issue in small open-economies is whether policymakers should respond to exchange rate movements when they formulate monetary policy. Micro-founded models tend to suggest that there is little to be gained from responding to exchange rate movements, and the literature has largely...

We use the two-country euro-area model developed by Quint and Rabanal (2014) to study policymaking in the European Monetary Union (EMU). We focus on strategic interactions: 1) between an EMU-level monetary authority and an EMU-level macroprudential authority, and; 2) between an EMU-level monetary...

This paper explains why the overall stance of monetary policy is effected by both interest rates and the exchange rate, and hence why a Monetary Conditions Indicator can provide useful information about the stance of policy. Three output gap equations estimated in this paper reveal that the real...

This Economic Letter summarizes the papers presented at a conference on "Interest Rates and Monetary Policy" held at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco on March 19 and 20, 2004, under the joint sponsorship of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and the Stanford Institute for...

Central to the conduct of monetary policy are inflation forecasts. Inflation forecast are not unique. Central banks and professional organizations generate inflation forecasts while households are surveyed about their inflation outlook. This paper estimates inflation forecast disagreement for...

Economic outcomes in dynamic economies with forward-looking agents depend crucially on whether or not the central bank can precommit, even in the absence of the traditional inflation bias. This paper quantifies the welfare differential between precommitment and discretionary policy in both a...