In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logically connected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgment aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue the op- posite. After proving a general impossibility...

I propose a new axiom on the aggregation of individual yes/no judgments on propositions into collective judgments: each collective judgment depends only on people's judgments on 'relevant' propositions. This contrasts with classical independence: each collective judgment depends only on people's...

This paper studies a class of judgment aggregation rules, to be called `scoring rules' after their famous counterpart in preference aggregation theory. A scoring rule delivers the collective judgments which reach the highest total `score' across the individuals, subject to the judgments having...

This article gives a brief and informal introduction to the theory of judgment aggregation and to the discursive dilemma, focusing on methodology and interpretation.

In the classical Condorcet jury model, different jurors votes are independent random variables, where each juror has the same probability p1/2 of voting for the correct alternative. The probability that the correct alternative will win under majority voting converges to 1 as the number of jurors...

In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logicallyconnected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgmentaggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue the op-posite. After proving a general impossibility...

In the classical Condorcet jury model, different jurors' votes are independent random variables, where each juror has the same probability p1/2 of voting for the correct alternative. The probability that the correct alternative will win under majority voting converges to 1 as the number of...

All existing impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions have one of two restrictions: they either use a controversial systematicity condition or apply only to special agendas of propositions with rich logical connections. An important open question is...

It is known that majority voting among several individuals on logically interconnected propositions may generate irrational collective judgments. We generalize majority voting by considering quota rules, which accept each proposition if and only if the number of individuals accepting it exceeds...

If each member of a group assigns a certain probability to a hypothesis, what probability should the collective as a whole assign? More generally, how should individual probability functions be merged into a single collective one? I investigate this question in case that the individual...