models, Shenoy's (1979) absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions provides a sufficient condition for core existence. We …. (2001) that guarantees nonemptiness of the core in more general models. As it turns out, the top coalition property implies … induced hedonic game satisfies the top coalition property. -- Coalition formation ; Core ; Paradox of smaller coalitions …

the clan by a "dualize and extend" procedure. These procedures are also useful for relating core elements and elements of … the Weber set of the corresponding games. -- Convex games ; Core , Dual games ; Marginal games ; Total clan games ; Weber …

We are concerned with the problem of core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games, which is to decide … whether a certain coalition structure belongs to the core of a given game. We show that this problem is co-NP complete when … players' preferences are additive. -- Additivity ; Coalition formation ; Core ; Co-NP completeness ; Hedonic games …

We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in … sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable … set in such games. -- Core ; Hedonic Games ; Monotonicity ; Stable Sets …

the clan by a "dualize and extend" procedure. These procedures are also useful for relating core elements and elements of …

We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in … sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable …

characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non …-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties. -- Coalitions … ; Core ; Stability ; Status-seeking …

characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non …-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties …

A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market may form coalitions … would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides … respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings. …

A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market may form coalitions … would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides … respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings …