We consider a general framework of optimal contract design under the heterogeneity and short-termism of agents. Our research shows that the optimal contract must weigh the agent's information rent, incentive cost, and benefit to overcome the contract's adverse selection and moral hazards. Agents...

We study a Bayesian learning model with heterogeneity in which the agents control both short-term manipulations and long-term efforts aimed at solving the optimal contract in dynamic environments. At the same time, considering the dynamic characteristics of contracts, the paper considers the...

Based on the principal-agent model, the continuous time optimal contract with asymmetric information is studied in the case of competition, cooperation, and neutrality between two agents, and the optimal behavior selection and incentive mechanism of agents are analyzed. The results show that the...

Based on the principal-agent model, the continuous-time optimal contract with asymmetric information is studied in the case of competition, cooperation, and neutrality between agents. According to stochastic optimal control theory, the optimal contract is given to solve the generalized dynamic...