Operational losses are true dangers for banks since their maximal values to signal default are difficult to predict. This risky situation is unlike default risk whose maximum values are limited by the amount of credit granted. For example, our data from a very large US bank show that this bank...

This paper is one of the first attempts to conduct an empirical investigation of the relationship between bank capital, securitization and bank risk-taking in a context of the rapid growth in off-balance-sheet activities. The data come from the Canadian financial sector. Evidence from the...

We address the moral hazard problem of securitization using a principal-agent model where the investor is the principal and the lender is the agent. Our model considers structured asset-backed securitization with a credit enhancement procedure. We assume that the originator can affect the...

We model the new quantitative aspects of market risk management for banks that Basel established in 2016 and came into effect in January 2019. Market risk is measured by Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) or Expected Shortfall at a confidence level of 97.5%. The regulatory backtest remains largely...

Our data, relating to a period of extreme market turmoil, show typical leptokurtosis and skewness, leading us to consider the skewed exponential power distribution of Fernández et al. (1995), referred to as the SEP3. We demonstrate that the conditional forecasting of VaR and CVaR, made up of a...

We demonstrate how a mixture of two SEP3 densities (skewed exponential power distribution of Fernández et al., 1995) can model the conditional forecasting of VaR and CVaR to efficiently cover market risk at regulatory levels of 1% and 2.5%, as well as at the additional 5% level. Our data...