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It is known that there are school choice problems without an efficient and stable assignment. We consider comparing assignments in terms of their stability by comparing their sets of blocking (student-school) pairs or comparing their sets of blocking students who are involved in at least one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014100104
We investigate efficient and minimally unstable Pareto improvements over the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism — a popular school choice mechanism which is stable but not efficient. We show that there is no Pareto improvement over the DA mechanism which is minimally unstable among efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012822608
In the context of priority-based allocation of objects, we formulate methods to compare assignments in terms of their stability. We introduce three basic properties that a reasonable stability comparison should satisfy. We show that, for any stability comparison satisfying the three properties,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012839306
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We investigate efficient and minimally unstable Pareto improvements over the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism-a popular school choice mechanism that is stable but not efficient. We show that there is no Pareto improvement over the DA mechanism that is minimally unstable among efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806473
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012204169
We consider decentralized one-to-one matching markets with myopic and farsighted agents. We study myopic-farsighted stable sets that are internally and externally stable when myopic agents only care about their immediate payoffs, while farsighted agents take into account further possible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014261524
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