It is known that there are school choice problems without an efficient and stable assignment. We consider comparing assignments in terms of their stability by comparing their sets of blocking (student-school) pairs or comparing their sets of blocking students who are involved in at least one...

We investigate efficient and minimally unstable Pareto improvements over the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism — a popular school choice mechanism which is stable but not efficient. We show that there is no Pareto improvement over the DA mechanism which is minimally unstable among efficient...

In the context of priority-based allocation of objects, we formulate methods to compare assignments in terms of their stability. We introduce three basic properties that a reasonable stability comparison should satisfy. We show that, for any stability comparison satisfying the three properties,...

We investigate efficient and minimally unstable Pareto improvements over the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism-a popular school choice mechanism that is stable but not efficient. We show that there is no Pareto improvement over the DA mechanism that is minimally unstable among efficient...

We consider decentralized one-to-one matching markets with myopic and farsighted agents. We study myopic-farsighted stable sets that are internally and externally stable when myopic agents only care about their immediate payoffs, while farsighted agents take into account further possible...