This paper develops a novel theory of capital mis-allocation within firms that stems from managers’ empire building and informational frictions within the organization. Introducing an internal capital market into a two-factor model of multi-segment firms, we show that international competition...

This paper introduces an internal capital market into a two-factor model of multi-segment frms that features managers' empire building and informational frictionswithin the organization. Our novel theory shows that international trade imposesdiscipline on divisional managers and improves capital...

We develop a novel theory of mis-allocation within firms (rather than between firms) due to managers' empire building. We introduce an in- ternal capital market into a two-factor model of multi-segment firms. We show that more open markets impose discipline on competition for capital within...

This paper develops a novel theory of capital mis-allocation within firms that stems from managers’ empire building and informational frictions within the organization. Introducing an internal capital market into a two-factor model of multi-segment firms, we show that international competition...