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In this paper we show that unlike in Bayesian frameworks asymmetric information does matter and can explain differences in common knowledge decisions due to ambiguous character of agents' private information. Agents share a common-but-not-necessarily-additive prior beliefs represented by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708088
In this paper, we extend Aumann’s (Ann Stat 4:1236–1239, 1976) probabilistic agreement theorem to situations in which agents’ prior beliefs are represented by a common neo-additive capacity. In particular, we characterize the family of updating rules for neo-additive capacities, which are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011166521
Individuals exhibit a randomization preference if they prefer random mixtures of two bets to each of the involved bets. Such preferences provide the foundation of various models of uncertainty aversion. However, it has to our knowledge not been empirically investigated whether uncertainty-averse...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273612
Contrary to Yoo’s (1991) [Yoo, K.-R., 1991. The iterative law of expectation and non-additive probability measure. Economics Letters 37, 145–149] result, it is shown that the law of iterated expectations can be maintained in the class of Choquet expected utility preferences, even though...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678831
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009324553
In this paper, we extend Aumann’s (Ann Stat 4:1236–1239, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">1976</CitationRef>) probabilistic agreement theorem to situations in which agents’ prior beliefs are represented by a common neo-additive capacity. In particular, we characterize the family of updating rules for neo-additive capacities, which are...</citationref>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993544
Many theories of updating under ambiguity assume either dynamic consistency or consequentialism to underpin … consequentialism than with dynamic consistency and that this result is even stronger among ambiguity averse subjects. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049819
Two rationality arguments are used to justify the link between conditional and unconditional preferences in decision theory : dynamic consistency and consequentialism. Dynamic consistency requires that ex ante contingent choices are respected by up dated preferences. Consequentialism states that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071929
Many theories of updating under ambiguity assume either dynamic consistency or consequentialism to underpin … consequentialism than with dynamic consistency and that this result is even stronger among ambiguity averse subjects. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011073068
Two rationality arguments are used to justify the link between conditional and unconditional preferences in decision theory: dynamic consistency and consequentialism. Dynamic consistency requires that ex ante contingent choices are respected by updated preferences. Consequentialism states that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422198