Similar Search Results

Price discrimination through communication

Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh V. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 10 (2015) 2, pp. 597-648

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346883

Talking behind your back : asymmetric communication in a three-person dilemma

Abbink, Klaus; Dong, Lu; Huang, Lingbo - 2018

Communication has been regarded as one of the most effective devices in promoting team cooperation. But asymmetric … communication sometimes breeds collusion and is detrimental to team efficiency. Here, we present experimental evidence showing that … excluding one member from team communication hurts team cooperation: the communicating partners collude in profit allocation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011912001

Communication, leadership and coordination failure

Dong, Lu; Montero, María; Possajennikov, Alexandre - 2015

Using experimental methods, this paper investigates the limits of communication and leadership in aiding group … communication and leadership are expected to help in coordinating on such an equilibrium. We consider an environment in which the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011318403

Communicating subjective evaluations

Lang, Matthias - 2014

Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? Suppose the principal's evaluation is private information, but she can provide justification by sending a costly cheap-talk message. If she does not provide justification, her message space is restricted, but the message is costless. I...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361447

Communicating subjective evaluations

Lang, Matthias - 2012 - this version: August 2013

Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? In this paper the principal's evaluation is private information, but she can provide justification by sending a costly cheap-talk message. I show that the principal explains her evaluation to the agent if the evaluation turns out to be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009569527

Preventive wars

Abbink, Klaus; Dong, Lu; Huang, Lingbo - 2022

preventive wars when the power shift is smaller and when the rising state has the commitment power. Communication and repeated …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012801942

Mechanism design with narratives

Lang, Matthias - 2020

Individuals use narratives as rationales or justifications to make their claims more convincing. I provide a general framework for partial verifiability based on narratives. Narratives give many reasons and arguments. The receiver derives the message’s meaning by aggregating these reasons; her...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012263427

Price discrimination through communication

Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh V. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 2, pp. 597-648

We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673357

Central bank communication with the general public : promise or false hope?

Blinder, Alan S.; Ehrmann, Michael; Haan, Jakob de; … - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013279256

Talking behind your back : communication and team cooperation

Abbink, Klaus; Dong, Lu; Huang, Lingbo - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 68 (2022) 7, pp. 5187-5200

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013369291