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Does membership in international organizations increase governments' credibility? : testing the effects of delegating powers

Dreher, Axel (contributor); Voigt, Stefan (contributor) - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003688912

Does membership on the UN Security Council influence IMF decisions? : evidence from panel data

Dreher, Axel (contributor); Sturm, Jan-Egbert (contributor); … - 2006

We investigate whether temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the IMF, using panel data for 191 countries over the period 1951 to 2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary UN Security Council membership and participation in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003665971

Does membership on the UN security council influence IMF decisions? : evidence from panel data

Dreher, Axel (contributor); Sturm, Jan-Egbert (contributor); … - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003387345

The costs of favoritism : is politically-driven aid less effective?

Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - 2010

World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated – such as those granted to … governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank … Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003942325

The costs of favoritism : is politically-driven aid less effective?

Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - 2010

World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to … governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank … Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944718

Does membership in international organizations increase goverments' credibility? : testing the effects of delegating powers

Dreher, Axel; Voigt, Stefan - In: Journal of comparative economics : the journal of the … 39 (2011) 3, pp. 326-348

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009308998

Politics and IMF conditionality

Dreher, Axel; Sturm, Jan-Egbert; Vreeland, James Raymond - 2013 - This version: June 2013

Bailouts sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are famous for their conditionality: in return for continued installments of desperately needed loans, governments must comply with austere policy changes. Many have suggested, however, that politically important countries face rather...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009765008

Politics and IMF conditionality

Dreher, Axel; Sturm, Jan-Egbert; Vreeland, James Raymond - 2013 - This version: June 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009757253

The costs of favoritism : is politically driven aid less effective?

Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - In: Economic development and cultural change 62 (2013) 1, pp. 157-191

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336273

The costs of favoritism : is politically-driven aid less effective?

Dreher, Axel (contributor) - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336343