Similar Search Results

Minasyan, Anna - 2015

Political misalignment and greater ideological distance between donor and recipient governments may render foreign aid less effective by adding to transaction costs and eroding trust. In addition, development aid from the West may lead to adverse growth effects in the global South due to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011459972

Buying votes and international organizations : the dirty work-hypothesis

Dreher, Axel; Lang, Valentin; Rosendorff, B. Peter; … - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012037759

The political economy of multilateral aid funds

Dreher, Axel; Simon, Jenny; Valasek, Justin - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012037845

The political economy of foreign aid : allocation, timing, and effectivenes

Eichenauer, Vera - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012016430

The political economy of international organizations

Dreher, Axel; Lang, Valentin - 2016

We review the literature on the political economy of international organizations (IOs). Considering IOs as products of the preferences of various actors rather than monolithic entities we focus on national politicians, international bureaucrats, interest groups, and voters. By looking into the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011536240

Membership has its privileges : the effect of membership in international organizations on FDI

Dreher, Axel; Mikosch, Heiner; Voigt, Stefan - In: World development : the multi-disciplinary … 66 (2015), pp. 346-358

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494899

Geopolitics, aid and growth

Dreher, Axel; Eichenauer, Vera; Gehring, Kai - 2014

We investigate the effects of short-term political motivations on the effectiveness of foreign aid. Specifically, we test whether the effect of aid on economic growth is reduced by the share of years a country has served on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the period the aid has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010425577

Buying votes and international organizations : the dirty work-hypothesis

Dreher, Axel; Lang, Valentin; Rosendorff, B. Peter; … - 2018

We show how major shareholders can exploit their power over international organizations to hide their foreign-policy interventions from domestic audiences. We argue that major powers exert influence bilaterally when domestic audiences view the intervention favorably. When domestic audiences are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011927941

The costs of favoritism : is politically driven aid less effective?

Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - In: Economic development and cultural change 62 (2013) 1, pp. 157-191

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336273

The costs of favoritism : is politically-driven aid less effective?

Dreher, Axel (contributor) - 2010

World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to … governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank … Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336343

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Next
Last