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The political economy of international organizations
Dreher, Axel; Lang, Valentin - 2016
We review the literature on the political economy of international organizations (IOs). Considering IOs as products of the preferences of various actors rather than monolithic entities we focus on national politicians, international bureaucrats, interest groups, and voters. By looking into the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011536240
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The Political Economy of International Organizations
Dreher, Axel - 2016
We review the literature on the political economy of international organizations (IOs). Considering IOs as products of the preferences of various actors rather than monolithic entities we focus on national politicians, international bureaucrats, interest groups, and voters. By looking into the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012980581
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The political economy of international organizations
Dreher, Axel; Lang, Valentin - 2019
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012880851
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The Costs of Favoritism : Is Politically-Driven Aid Less Effective?
Dreher, Axel - 2010
World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated – such as those granted to … governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank … Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146443
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The Costs of Favoritism : Is Politically-Driven Aid Less Effective?
Dreher, Axel - 2010
World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated – such as those granted to … governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank … Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146478
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Buying votes and international organizations
Dreher, Axel; Vreeland, James Raymond - 2011
This study explores a basic idea in political economy: Trading money for political influence. Our focus is at the level of international institutions, where governments may exploit their influence in one organization to gain leverage over another. In particular, we consider the lending...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009126428
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The costs of favoritism : is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel (contributor) - 2010
World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to … governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank … Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336343
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Buying votes and international organizations
Dreher, Axel; Vreeland, James Raymond - 2011
This study explores a basic idea in political economy: Trading money for political influence. Our focus is at the level of international institutions, where governments may exploit their influence in one organization to gain leverage over another. In particular, we consider the lending...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010348627
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The costs of favoritism : is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - 2010
World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated – such as those granted to … governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank … Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003942325
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The costs of favoritism : is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - 2010
World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to … governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank … Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944718