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Acting autonomously or mimicking the state and peers? : a panel tobit analysis of financial dependence and aid allocation by Swiss NGOs
Dreher, Axel; Nunnenkamp, Peter; Öhler, Hannes; … - 2009
NGO aid is still widely believed to be superior to official aid (ODA). However, the incentives of NGOs to excel and target aid to the poor and deserving are increasingly disputed. We contribute to the emerging literature on the allocation of NGO aid by performing panel Tobit estimations for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003832118
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Acting autonomously or mimicking the state and peers? : A panel Tobit analysis of financial dependence and aid allocation by Swiss NGOs
Dreher, Axel; Nunnenkamp, Peter; Öhler, Hannes; … - 2009
NGO aid is still widely believed to be superior to official aid (ODA). However, the incentives of NGOs to excel and target aid to the poor and deserving are increasingly disputed. We contribute to the emerging literature on the allocation of NGO aid by performing panel Tobit estimations for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003811851
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Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending : theory and empirical evidence
Marchesi, Silvia; Sabani, Laura; Dreher, Axel - 2009
We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003908576
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Acting autonomously or mimicking the state and peers? : a panel Tobit analysis of financial dependence and aid allocation by Swiss NGOs
Dreher, Axel; Nunnenkamp, Peter; Öhler, Hannes; … - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003908621
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Acting autonomously or mimicking the state and peers? : a panel Tobit analysis of financial dependence and aid allocation by Swiss NGOs
Dreher, Axel; Nunnenkamp, Peter; Öhler, Hannes; … - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008903292
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Acting autonomously or mimicking the state and peers? : a panel Tobit analysis of financial dependence and aid allocation by Swiss NGOs
Dreher, Axel; Nunnenkamp, Peter; Öhler, Hannes; … - 2009
NGO aid is still widely believed to be superior to official aid (ODA). However, the incentives of NGOs to excel and target aid to the poor and deserving are increasingly disputed. We contribute to the emerging literature on the allocation of NGO aid by performing panel Tobit estimations for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008855951
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Staff growth in international organizations : a principal-agent problem? ; an empirical anaylsis
Vaubel, Roland; Dreher, Axel; Soylu, Uğurlu - In: Public choice 133 (2007) 3/4, pp. 275-295
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003680650
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Acting autonomously or mimicking the state and peers? : a panel Tobit analysis of financial dependence and aid allocation by Swiss NGOs
Dreher, Axel; Nunnenkamp, Peter; Öhler, Hannes; … - 2009
NGO aid is still widely believed to be superior to official aid (ODA). However, the incentives of NGOs to excel and target aid to the poor and deserving are increasingly disputed. We contribute to the emerging literature on the allocation of NGO aid by performing panel Tobit estimations for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003876175
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Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending : theory and empirical evidence
Marchesi, Silvia; Sabani, Laura; Dreher, Axel - 2009
We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003876384
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Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending : theory and empirical evidence
Marchesi, Silvia; Sabani, Laura; Dreher, Axel - 2009
We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003813630