We consider an imperfectly competitive loan market in which a local relationship lender has an information advantage vis-à-vis distant transaction lenders. Competitive pressure from the transaction lenders prevents the local lender from extracting the full surplus from projects, so that she...

We present a simple model of personal finance in which an incumbent lender has an information advantage vis-a-vis both potential competitors and households. In order to extract more consumer surplus, a lender with sufficient market power may engage in "irresponsible" lending, approving credit...

This paper shows that active investors, such as venture capitalists, can affect the speed at which new ventures grow. In the absence of product market competition, new ventures financed by active investors grow faster initially, though in the long run those financed by passive investors are able...

Wir untersuchen die Rolle von Vertragstypen und Zugangsregulierung auf Innovation und Wettbewerb. In einem Duopolmodell zeigen wir, dass Ex-post-Verträge, die nach den Investitionsentscheidungen getroffen werden, zu einer Welt führen, in der seltener Infrastruktur dupliziert wird, in der es...