The class of bargaining solutions that are defined on the domain of finite sets of alternatives and satisfy Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO), Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Covariance (COV), is characterized. These solutions select from the set of maximizers of a nonsymmetric Nash...

Incomplete preferences over lotteries on a ¯nite set of alternatives satisfying, besides independence and continuity, a property called bad outcome aversion are considered. These preferences are characterized in terms of their speci¯c multi-expected utility representations (cf. Dubra et al.,...

We study a framework where two duopolists compete repeatedly in prices and where chosen prices potentially affect future market shares, but certainly do not affect current sales. This assumption of consumer inertia causes (noncooperative) coordination on high prices only to be possible as an...

In this paper we analyze the performance of a recently proposed sequential auction, called the c-bisection auction, that can be used for a sale of a single indivisible object. We discuss the running time and the e±ciency in the ex-post equilibrium of the auction. We show that by changing the...

In this paper we present a generalization of the Shapley-Ichiishi result for convex games to the class of all exact games. Then we discuss two applications to the class of convex games. First we show that it can indeed be used to give an alternative proof of the Shapley-Ichiishi result. Secondly...

We study a framework where two duopolists compete repeatedly in prices and where cho-sen prices potentially affect future market shares, but certainly do not affect current sales.This assumption of consumer inertia causes (noncooperative) coordination on high pricesonly to be possible as an...

The classical bankruptcy problem (O''Neill, 1982) is extended by assuming that the agents have non-homogenous preferences over several estates. A special case is the one in which there are finitely many estates and the agents have homogenous preferences, i.e., constant utilities, per estate. In...

The VCG mechanism has some nice properties if the agents-are-substitutes property holds.For example, for combinatorial auctions the property assures that the VCG mechanism is supported by a pricing equilibrium. The existence of such a pricing equilibrium is a necessary condition for the...

We analyze whether noncooperative collusive equilibria are harder to sustain when individual demand levels are not fixed but are able to fluctuate. To do this, we extend a Bertrand type model of price competition to allow for fluctuating market shares when prices are equal. We find that, the...

Two-person noncooperative games with finitely many pure strategies and ordinal preferences over pure outcomes are considered, in which probability distributions resulting from mixed strategies are evaluated according to t-degree stochastic dominance. A t-best reply is a strategy that induces a...