We report on an experiment exploring whether and how players may learn to use a random device to coordinate on a correlated equilibrium that Pareto dominates the Nash equilibria of a two-player Battle of the Sexes game. By contrast with other studies exploring recommendations and correlated...

We experimentally assess the predictive power of two equilibrium selection principles for binary N-player entry games with strategic complementarities. In static entry games, we test the theory of global games which posits that players play games of complete information as if they were playing a...

We report on an experiment examining behavior and equilibrium selection in two similar, infinitely repeated games, Stag Hunt and Prisoner's Dilemma under anonymous random matching. We are interested in the role that precedents may play for equilibrium selection between these two stage game...

We report on an experiment examining behavior and equilibrium selection in two similar, infinitely repeated games, Stag Hunt and Prisoner's Dilemma under anonymous random matching. We are interested in the role that precedents may play for equilibrium selection between these two stage game...

We study the Lagos and Wright (2005) model of monetary exchange in the laboratory. With a finite population of sufficiently patient agents, this model has a unique monetary equilibrium and a continuum of non-monetary gift exchange equilibria, some of which Pareto dominate the monetary...

We experimentally study decentralized organizational learning. Our objective is to understand how learning members of an organization cope with the confounding effects of the simultaneous learning of others. We test the predictions of a stylized, rational agent model of organizational learning...

We report the results of an experiment in which subjects play games repeatedly against changing opponents. In one treatment, "senders" send messages to "receivers" indicating intended actions in that round, and receivers observe senders' previous-round actions (when matched with another...

We report results from an experiment that explores the empirical validity of correlated equilibrium, an important generalization of the Nash equilibrium concept. Specifically, we seek to understand the conditions under which subjects will condition their behavior on private, third-party...

We report on an experiment examining behavior and equilibrium selection in two similar, infinitely repeated games, Stag Hunt and Prisoner's Dilemma under anonymous random matching. We are interested in the role that precedents may play for equilibrium selection between these two stage game...

We experimentally examine equilibrium refinements in static and dynamic binary choice games of complete information with strategic complementarities known as “entry†games. Our aim is to assess the predictive power of two different equilibrium selection principles. In static entry...