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Driving forces behind informal sanctions

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - 2005

theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators' punishment is almost exclusively targeted … between different fairness principles. Fairness theories that are based on the assumption that players compare their own … the defectors. Fairness theories assuming that players aim to minimize payoff inequalities cannot explain the fact that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267590

Cardiovascular Consequences of Unfair Pay

Falk, Armin; Menrath, Ingo; Verde, Pablo Emilio; … - 2011

health, and fairness of pay. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011601022

Living in two neighborhoods: Social interaction effects in the lab

Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs; Gächter, Simon - 2009

Field evidence suggests that people belonging to the same group often behave similarly, i.e., behavior exhibits social interaction effects. We conduct a laboratory experiment that avoids the identification problem present in the field and allows us to study the behavioral logic of social...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277490

Organizations, Diffused Pivotality and Immoral Outcomes

Falk, Armin; Szech, Nora - 2013

This paper studies how organizational design affects moral outcomes. Subjects face the decision to either kill mice for money or to save mice. We compare a Baseline treatment where subjects are fully pivotal to a Diffused-Pivotality treatment where subjects simultaneously choose in groups of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319464

Institutions and Contract Enforcement

Falk, Armin; Huffman, David; Macleod, W. Bentley - 2011

We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions - dismissal barriers, and bonus pay - affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333911

Institutions and contract enforcement

Falk, Armin; Huffman, David; MacLeod, W. Bentley - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264349

Institutions and contract enforcement

Falk, Armin; Huffman, David; MacLeod, W. Bentley - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268924

Implicit contracts, unemployment, and labor market segmentation

Altmann, Steffen; Falk, Armin; Huffman, David - 2010

We analyze the impact of imperfect contract enforcement on the emergence of unemployment. In an experimental labor market where trading parties can form long-term employment relationships, we compare a work environment where effort is observable, but not verifiable to a situation where explicit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269827

The Impact of Distributional Preferences on (Experimental) Markets for Expert Services

Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Dulleck, Uwe - 2009

Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies arising from informational asymmetries between expert sellers and customers. While standard theory predicts that inefficiencies disappear if customers can verify the quality received, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294825

The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2009

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market break-down. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294835