Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies caused by superior information of sellers about the surplus-maximizing quality. While standard theory predicts that equal mark-up prices solve the credence goods problem if customers can verify the quality received, experimental evidence...

Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies arising from informational asymmetries between expert sellers and customers. While standard theory predicts that inefficiencies disappear if customers can verify the quality received, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with...

Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies arising from informational asymmetries between expert sellers and customers. While standard theory predicts that inefficiencies disappear if customers can verify the quality received, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with...

We report results from an incentivized lab-in-the-field experiment on delegation behavior among a sample of 64 Australian couples aged 60 years and above. Participants were required to complete a series of decision-making tasks, which they had the option of either completing independently or...

We examine the delegation behavior among Australian heterosexual couples aged 60 years and above using an incentivized experiment which requires participants to complete a series of ten financial decision-making tasks independently or delegate to their spouse. There is evidence of a strong...

We examine delegation of financial decision-making in Australian couples aged 60 years and above. Men show extremely low likelihood of delegating to their spouse. The odds of women delegating to their husbands are nearly 25 times higher than that of men delegating to their wives. This gender...

Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies arising from informational asymmetries between expert sellers and customers. While standard theory predicts that inefficiencies disappear if customers can verify the quality received, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with...

Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies arising from informational asymmetries between expert sellers and customers. While standard theory predicts that inefficiencies disappear if customers can verify the quality received, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with...