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Contracting for Infrastructure Projects as Credence Goods

Dulleck, Uwe; Li, Jianpei - National Centre for Econometric Research (NCER) - 2011

Large infrastructure projects are a major responsibility of government, who usually lacks expertise to fully specify the demanded projects. Contractors, typically experts on such projects, advise of the needed design in their bids. Producing the right design is nevertheless costly. We model the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009325824

Insights into the Impact of Bankruptcy's Public Record on Entrepreneurial Activity: Evidence from Economic Experiments

Dulleck, Uwe; Howell, Nicola J.; Koessler, Ann-Kathrin; … - 2018

Many Anglo-American jurisdictions aim to provide debtors with a 'fresh start' after a personal bankruptcy. However, we query the extent to which debtors can achieve a fresh start if records of individual bankruptcies are publicly available, with no restrictions on their use. To inform the legal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011874381

Insights into the impact of bankruptcy's public record on entrepreneurial activity : evidence from economic experiments

Dulleck, Uwe; Howell, Nicola J.; Koessler, Ann-Kathrin; … - 2018

In this paper, I assess labor market returns of a substantial skill upgrade: college enrollment of the vocationally trained, non-traditional students who do not have the formal entry requirement. Using propensity-scoreadjusted regressions and the National Educational Panel Study, I find that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011876209

Experts vs. discounters: Consumer free riding and experts withholding advice in markets for credence goods

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf - 2007

This paper studies the incentives for credence goods experts to invest effort in diagnosis if effort is both costly and unobservable, and if they face competition by discounters who are not able to perform a diagnosis. The unobservability of diagnosis effort and the credence characteristic of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293427

Experts vs. discounters: consumer free riding and experts withholding advice in markets for credence goods

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf - 2005

This paper studies price competition between experts and discounters in a market for credence goods. While experts can identify a consumer’s problem by exerting costly but unobservable diagnosis effort, discounters just sell treatments without giving any advice. The unobservability of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294501

Price discrimination via the choice of distribution channels

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf - 2005

This article studies the use of different distribution channels as an instrument of price discrimination in credence goods markets. In credence goods markets, where consumers do not know which quality of the good or service they need, price discrimination proceeds along the dimension of quality...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294597

The Impact of Distributional Preferences on (Experimental) Markets for Expert Services

Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Dulleck, Uwe - 2009

, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with endogenous prices. We identify heterogeneous distributional preferences … selfish, efficiency loving, inequality averse, inequality loving or competitive. Results show that most subjects exhibit non …-standard distributional preferences, among which efficiency-loving and inequality aversion are most frequent. We discuss implications for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294825

The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2009

determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields … efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation … higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294835

How social preferences shape incentives in (experimental) markets for credence goods

Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Dulleck, Uwe - 2015

Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies caused by superior information of sellers about the surplus-maximizing quality. While standard theory predicts that equal mark-up prices solve the credence goods problem if customers can verify the quality received, experimental evidence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382731

The impact of distributional preferences on (experimental) markets for expert services

Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Dulleck, Uwe - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269558