Which and how many attributes are relevant for the sorting of agents in a matching market? This paper addresses these questions by constructing indices of mutual attractiveness that aggregate information about agents' attributes. The first k indices for agents on each side of the market provide...

This paper proposes an assignment model where sorting occurs on attributes including both skills (Sattinger, 1979) and preferences (Tinbergen, 1956). The key feature of this model is that the wage function admits both jobs' and workers' attributes as arguments. Since this function is generically...

This paper proposes an assignment model where sorting occurs on at- tributes that are simultaneously a skill (Sattinger, 1979) and a preference (Tinbergen, 1956). The key feature of this model is that the wage func- tion admits both jobs and workers attributes as arguments. Since this function...

Which and how many attributes are relevant for the sorting of agents in a matching market? This paper adresses these questions by constructing indices of mutual attractiveness that aggregate information about agents' attributes. The rst k indices for agents on each side of the market provide the...

This paper proposes an assignment model where sorting occurs on attributes including both skills (Sattinger, 1979) and preferences (Tinbergen, 1956). The key feature of this model is that the wage function admits both jobs' and workers' attributes as arguments. Since this function is generically...

Which and how many attributes are relevant for the sorting of agents in a matching market? This paper addresses these questions by constructing indices of mutual attractiveness that aggregate information about agents' attributes. The first k indices for agents on each side of the market provide...